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ARTICLE
Born radicals? Prevent, positivism, and ‘race-
thinking’
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ABSTRACT In the contemporary Western climate, counter-terrorism discourse dealing
with so-called Islamic extremism appears to be obsessed with trying to understand the
motives behind what prompts somebody to turn to terrorism. This paper will argue that
attempts to locate extremist motives in such a way can be seen to reinforce earlier iterations
of positivist criminology and race-thinking. Through a critical examination of the works of
criminologist Cesare Lombroso, this paper will tease out the interconnections between his
‘criminal types’ thesis, and the British government’s current Prevent policy that seeks to
identify ‘extremist types.’ By developing a rich critique of these positivist approaches, the
paper will go on to question how we might think beyond the essentialism, reductivism, and
racism/Islamophobia inherent within such frameworks. In this way, the paper raises a series
of conceptual implications for criminology and terrorism studies, while at the same time,
develops a contribution to critical race and ethnicity studies.
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Introduction
O
ne of the key features of the global war on terror has been
the development of countering violent extremism (CVE)
programmes to meet the threat of ‘home-grown’ terror-
ists. The UK’s counter terrorism strategy, CONTEST, is made up
of four policy strands—Pursue, Protect, Prepare and Prevent.
Pursue uses conventional counter terror practices and places
suspected terrorists (both home and abroad) under military,
policing, intelligence and judicial measures. Protect is based on
ensuring that through greater protective security measures, the
UK is equipped with the appropriate infrastructure to mitigate
the effects of a terror attack. Prepare is focused on having effective
procedures in place so that in the event of a terror attack, the
country is resilient. Prevent is aimed at ‘countering the ideology’
thought to be propagated by terrorists and seeks to deal with the
so-called driving factors of terrorism (Sabir, 2017; p 203). This
has led to an ever-expanding army of ‘experts’ dedicated to the
task of empirically determining an extremist proﬁle and pre-
dicting future terrorists (Wight, 2015, p 210; Monaghan and
Molnar, 2016, pp 393–413). As a consequence, extensive lists and
classiﬁcations have been generated to uncover the ‘signs’ of
extremism.
Since its inception, the Prevent strategy has been increasingly
challenged for reinforcing Islamophobic prejudices through
racialized practices of surveillance on primarily Muslim com-
munities (Sian, 2015a, pp 183–201). For established liberal
democracies, such programmes present a signiﬁcant challenge as
they involve a curtailment of civil rights over a sustained period of
time. Despite these concerns, there is a general agreement that the
identiﬁcation of violent extremism is key to the success of counter
terrorism campaigns. Consequently, the British CVE programme
has become the model for many other Western countries and its
implementation has had an international signiﬁcance (Sabir,
2016, pp 1–15). It is against this backdrop of security and reg-
ulation that this paper sets out to explore the conceptual overlap
between the discourse on counter extremism and its nineteenth
century antecedents in the development of positivist criminology.
This paper is interested in developing a critique of Prevent by
arguing that the discourse (including various classiﬁcations,
indicators, and categories) that has been used and applied to
‘detect’ extremism shares a conceptual familiarity with 19th cen-
tury race-thinking and positivist criminology, and is therefore
likely to suffer the same methodological ﬂaws. Through an ana-
lytical engagement with the works of Cesare Lombroso (1876)
and his Criminal Man thesis, this paper will build an account to
demonstrate the political function of (race) science and crim-
inalisation in the disciplining of racialized populations. The
comparison being made between Lombroso’s thesis and the
Prevent programme is of particular importance for this paper. In
the same way that Lombroso employed the ‘scientiﬁc method’ to
develop typologies to draw conclusions around criminality, the
Prevent programme has similarly attempted to use a scientiﬁcally
based framework to draw evaluations around extremism. This has
been done through the formulation of various indicators used by
Prevent to determine extremism. Such indicators are based on the
Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG 22+) framework developed
by psychologists, Christopher Dean and Monica Lloyd (Qureshi,
2016, pp 12–13).
In a similar way to Lombroso’s model of identifying criminals,
ERG22+ is based on trying to identify extremism by establishing a
series of classiﬁcations that claim to have a ‘psychology evidence
base’ (ibid). The ERG22+ framework has as such been given
credence to ‘scientiﬁcally’ predict future terrorists, as well as
inﬂuence referrals to the governments de-radicalisation pro-
gramme, Channel (ibid). Prevent’s ‘Channel Vulnerability
Assessment Framework 2012’ contains a total of 22 indicators of
extremism, all of which have been derived from ERG22+ (ibid).
The paper to follow will examine these indicators alongside
broader strategies around policing, as a way to tease out the
complex and textured intersections between Lombroso and cur-
rent counter terror practice. By exploring the limits of such
positivist approaches, the paper will argue that these frameworks
appear to be structured more so by the logics of racism/Islamo-
phobia rather than fact/truth.
Lombroso and positivism
Positivism broadly refers to a philosophical outlook that main-
tains the idea that all phenomena, from physics to sociology, can
be understood through the application of scientiﬁc method. It can
be understood as an epistemological stance that rejects social
constructionism and genealogical approaches, as such it repre-
sents, “one way of thinking about the basis on which knowledge
can claim to be scientiﬁc” (Walklate, 1998, p 3). Positivists sub-
scribe to the notion that scientiﬁc knowledge and reason can
control and manage not only nature, but also social life. This
position represents a key characteristic of modern society and
inﬂuenced not only the natural sciences, but also the social sci-
ences including criminology. The desire to produce scientiﬁc,
objective and value-free knowledge in the ﬁeld of criminology has
been particularly strong, and according to Sandra Walklate (1998)
positivist criminology is underpinned by, “a commitment to
objectivity; understanding the determined nature of criminal
behaviour; and by its ability to measure criminal behaviour” (ibid,
p 4). She goes on to suggest that through an understanding of
social, psychological and biological factors, it is claimed that the
actions and behaviours of criminals can be measured objectively,
thus maintaining a commitment to the scientiﬁc project and the
production of universal explanations (ibid).
For Walklate, the impulse to develop an analysis of crime that
would apply to all contexts has formed a key feature of crimin-
ology and is linked to the underlying desire to devise policy (ibid).
This point is particularly important for this paper, which goes on
to show how such articulations of positivist criminology (both
past and present) shape reductionist ideas, policies and pro-
grammes around criminality. In the case of Prevent, positivism
provides a necessary scientiﬁc veneer to various constructions of
Muslims and extremism that make the policy possible. In order to
understand the inﬂuence of earlier positivist thinking on con-
temporary counter terror policy and practice, we might want to
begin with Cesare Lombroso who is among the most widely cited
early positivist criminologists in standard European criminology
textbooks.
Lombroso is regarded as the founder of positivist criminology
(Agozino, 2003, p 4; Walklate, 1998, p 14; Young, 2011, p 71). He
drew upon racial science, eugenics, psychiatry, biology, and social
Darwinism to compile his works on the Criminal Man, ﬁrst
published in 1876. In his most infamous statement, Lombroso
claimed that individuals were ‘born criminal’ proposing that
criminality was inherent, and not a product of the social envir-
onment. Lombroso invested much of his energy into identifying
and classifying criminal types, and in Criminal Man his exam-
inations of the skulls of criminals led him to propose that they
could be categorised by their physical traits or ‘defects’ including,
deformed skulls, being taller than a ‘healthy person’, having
misshaped noses, slanted foreheads, big jaws, and having dark
eyes, dark hair, and dark skin (ibid). What emerged from Lom-
broso’s account was both the continuation and the expansion of
racial science thinking, whereby non-whites (and women who did
not conform to traditional gender roles) were constructed as
essentially criminal. Lombroso built upon earlier ideas of race-
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thinking which began to emerge in Europe during the long six-
teenth century as part of the new world inaugurated by colonial
expansion.1
Race-thinking was largely rooted within anthro-scientiﬁc the-
ories and gained prominence particularly during the period of
European Enlightenment (Lee, 2015, p 26). Notions of race were
mobilised to arrange humans according to phenotypical differ-
ences and as systems of classiﬁcations continued to advance, a
schema governed by white superiority and non-white inferiority
was established throughout Europe (ibid, p 33). This hierarchy
served as an important ideological tool to legitimise and justify
European practices of slavery, colonialism and genocide. The
appeal of racial science came in its claims of scientiﬁc objectivity,
reliability, and universal truths, however as Sandra Soo-Jin Lee
(2015) reminds us, such a discourse arose from a social landscape
of a particular set of beliefs (ibid, p 32), thus racial science was
adopted less for its claims for being ‘value free’ and more for its
capacity to justify racist policies through the creation of a see-
mingly ‘natural’ division of races (ibid, p 32).
As a consequence, earlier ethnological approaches (which were
guided by general standards of degrees of difference between the
races) were replaced with a new framework that sought to
establish an absolute difference between whites and non-whites
(Young, 1994, p 160). As Robert Young (1994) suggests, in this
new criterion, “non-whites were classiﬁed in terms of how much
they deviated from white standard. This constitutive difference of
the species became the central focus of racial theory” (ibid). In
other words, by declaring non-whites a different species, the
constitution of the US (which proclaimed that ‘all men were born
equal’) could be preserved, as such a classiﬁcation meant that
equality did not apply to non-whites who were categorised as an
entirely ‘other’ breed (ibid). Slavery was given the green light, and
from the 1840s onwards, ideas of polygenesis continued to spread
throughout Europe (ibid). Such thinking went on to inform a
number of academic disciplines-in particular the ﬁeld of crim-
inology, which was keen to incorporate such ideas.
The work of Lombroso was long one of the most inﬂuential in
the application of racial science to address social problems.
Lombroso’s most recognised assertion was that criminals were
‘born with evil inclinations,’ and through his examination of
cranial anatomy, biology, genetics, psychiatry, and anthropology,
read through a positivist epistemology, he was able to compile a
comprehensive catalogue to mark out speciﬁc criminal types.
Lombroso’s research fundamentally turned the study of crime
into a science. Through the use of Darwin’s theory of natural
selection Lombroso was able to create hierarchies of evolution
and make claims that the skulls of criminals were deformed,
resembling the skulls of rodents (Agozino, 2003, p 25). As such,
Lombroso’s theory of born criminals could be applied by iden-
tifying a range of defects to verify that criminals were simply
savages (ibid). Biko Agozino (2003) rightly points out that the
main problem for Lombroso lay in the fact that his catalogue of
defects paralleled the features of dark skinned Sicilians, who had
been racially constructed in both criminal justice discourse and
popular culture as representing the largest source of criminality in
Italy (ibid, Young, 2011, p 71). Although Lombroso went on to
revise his crude biological determinism, Agozino suggests that his
ideas remained inﬂuential as they conﬁrmed common sense
notions of pure blood and aristocracy, and more importantly, he
was the ﬁrst to have executed a scientiﬁc experiment in the ﬁeld
of criminology (ibid).
The violent extremist man: racialization and prevent
The current British counter terrorism Prevent programme shares
with Lombroso’s work a number of features. To make clear the
degree of overlap between Lombroso’s positivist criminology and
the development of Prevent, it is useful to outline the British
state’s attempt to deal with the home front of the war on terror.
Prevent is a key strand of the governments wider counter-
terrorism strategy CONTEST that was ofﬁcially introduced in
2006 by the Labour government following the London bombings
(7/7). The focus of the policy is to deal with so-called ‘extremist
ideology’ propagated by groups and individuals loosely deﬁned as
‘Islamic extremists.’ Consecutive governments and policy docu-
ments on Prevent have all made claim to the idea that extremist
ideology is at the very centre of driving terrorism (HM Govern-
ment, 2011, p 1).
As such, the key goal of Prevent is to identify and contain
suspected extremists. It does this by targeting those deemed
vulnerable to extremist ideologues and placing them through a
‘de-radicalisation’ process (ibid). This approach is therefore based
on the assumption that recognising the early signs of extremism is
a prerequisite in effectively counteracting extremism and thus
terrorism (Qureshi, 2016, pp 4–50, Monaghan and Molnar, 2016,
pp 393–413). Once a suspected extremist is identiﬁed, the indi-
vidual is then referred for de-radicalisation under the Channel
programme. Channel utilises a ‘scientiﬁcally’ based vulnerability
assessment framework (ERG22+) in order to evaluate the most
appropriate ‘de-radicalisation’ package that will be applied to the
individual (Qureshi, 2016, pp 18–20). This framework consists of
22 empirically based indicators that aid the task of spotting signs
of extremism (HM Government, 2012, pp 1–18). These include:
Grievance/Injustice; Threat; Identity; Meaning and belonging;
Status; Excitement, comradeship or adventure; Dominance and
control; Susceptibility to indoctrination; Political/moral motiva-
tion; Opportunisitc involvement; Family and/or friends support
extremist offending; Transitional periods; Group inﬂuence and
control; Mental health; Over-identiﬁcation with a group, cause or
ideology; Them and Us thinking; Dehumanisation of the enemy;
Attitudes that justify offending; Harmful means to an end;
Harmful objectives; Individual knowledge, skills; Access to net-
works, funding or equipment for terrorism; Criminal capability
(ibid).
Although such indicators appear broad and general and
could seemingly apply to anybody, in the context of the war on
terror, the underlying focus is exclusively upon Muslim bodies,
who through a particular set of markers, have been subjected to
practices of racialization (Sian, 2015a, pp 183–201). The
racialization of groups is not only restricted to those biological
markers which previously dominated race-thinking,2 rather in
the war on terror, racialization has come to signify a radical
‘otherness’ which distinguishes individuals and groups by a
stronger emphasis on origin and heritage, as well as physical
appearance (Meer and Modood, 2010, p 77). As such religious,
cultural, and phenotypical identiﬁcations infuse together to
mark out, or racialize Muslims (and those perceived to be
Muslim based on these characteristics) (Meer and Modood,
2010, p 77).
On further inspection of the indicators, it becomes clear to see
that such ‘signs’ are underpinned by racialized understandings of
Muslims, which are dependent upon culturally and religiously
deterministic frameworks (Sian, 2015a, pp 187–189). For exam-
ple, under the heading, Us and Them Thinking the literature
states: “An example is the Al Qa’ida inﬂuenced ‘single narrative’
explanation of world events in which Muslims are portrayed
across history as the victims of an evil and decadent West” (HM
Government, 2012, p 14). In relation to Dehumanisation of the
enemy, the literature asserts: “Al Qa’ida inﬂuenced offenders may
justify targeting members of their own Muslim community by
moral disgust at their hypocrisy and perceived betrayal of their
fellow Muslims” (ibid, p 15). Al Qa’ida activity is over-
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represented in the documentation, it is only under the Political/
moral motivation category that we see ‘other’ forms of extremism
brieﬂy mentioned (e.g., IRA, far right extremists, anti-abortionists
and the Basque separatist movement). In terms of Identity,
Meaning and Belonging it is suggested that:
This may be particularly attractive to those who have been
disrupted by moving from one country to another and who
may be confused by conﬂicting cultural demands…
individuals may have experienced an aimless lifestyle or
have indulged in behaviour contrary to a particular code of
faith and be attracted to extremist values to displace this
lifestyle and assuage guilt (ibid, p 9).
This example shows that even when not explicitly referring to
Muslims or Islam, the explanations strongly evoke ideas of
Muslimness, in that the potential extremist is linked to religion
and culture.
Prevent practitioners however are keen to insist that they are
targeting all forms extremism rather than focusing on particular
communities (ibid, 2015, p 3), yet there are various documented
cases which can be seen to trouble these claims. For example, in
2015, Mohammed Umar Farooq, a University of Staffordshire
postgraduate student, was interrogated by a university ofﬁcial for
reading a textbook on terrorism relating to his MA programme
on terrorism, crime and global security, in his university library.3
Needless to say the student was identiﬁed as Muslim. Similarly in
2016, teachers referred Muslim schoolboy, Rahman Mohammadi
to the police under Prevent for wearing a free Palestine badge.4 In
another case, teachers at a school in London questioned a Muslim
pupil under the Prevent policy about ISIS after he used the word
“eco-terrorist” in a French lesson.5 These cases draw connections
with the disproportionate targeting of Muslim bodies in which,
“the broad array of indicators posited as drivers of radicalisation
have furthered discriminatory practices targeting the Muslim
community as ‘usual suspects’” (Monaghan and Molnar, 2016, p
394).
Prevent policy claims that there is no single proﬁle of an
extremist, though such an assertion is not really possible given the
nature of the dependent variable “terrorist.” In Channel aware-
ness training packages, which have been rolled out across civil
society organisations on ‘how to spot an extremist,’ the proﬁling
of Muslims is explicit. Another warning sign often presented in
Prevent discourse is, “signiﬁcant changes to appearance/beha-
viour” (HM Government, 2008, p 18). Channel awareness
training seeks to examine this issue by providing a scenario
concerning a Muslim school girl who replaces her Western dress
and socialising activities, with wearing a hijab and taking a keen
interest in Islam. This change in appearance/behaviour is framed
as an early warning that she could go on to potentially engage
within extremist activity (see Fig. 1).
Alongside this, it has also been suggested that Muslim men face
potential criminalisation under Prevent for growing a beard.6 In
their research on counter terrorism policing practices in Canada,
Monaghan and Molnar (2016) found similar patterns at work.
For instance, in a training slide designed for the RMPC the same
assertion that, “there is no identiﬁable proﬁle but common
indicators” was presented. However despite this claim the dis-
course was unable to disassociate Muslims from radicalisation, as
such Islam/Muslims inevitably dominated the discussion on (de)
radicalisation:
As these training slides demonstrate, the efforts to convey
complexities in academic accounts of radicalisation are
absent in the constructions of difference that deﬁne police
operations. In this application of indicators, the nuance of
radicalisation studies is lost in the essentialising and
racialised imagery… Under the banner of a ‘bias-free’
policy, the search for indicators tends towards problematic
conjecture that draws upon racialised inferences in pre-
emptive operational contexts (Monaghan and Molnar,
2016, p 408).
It therefore seems apparent that the discourse of de-
radicalisation has disproportionately proﬁled Muslim commu-
nities despite claims of neutrality, objectivity and non-
discrimination. Ofﬁcial statistics go on to support this argu-
ment and reveal how Prevent overwhelmingly targets Muslims.
Data released by the Association of Chief Police Ofﬁcers under
the Freedom of Information Act, for example, shows that from
2007/08 until 2010/11, 67% of all people referred to Channel were
Muslim (Traquair, 2014). For unknown reasons, data was not
collected on religion between January 2011 and March 2012.
When data was re-collected from 2012 until 2014, it revealed that
57% of all referrals made to Channel were Muslim. Then from
2014 until 2016, it shows that 87% of Channel referrals were
Muslim (ibid, 2016). Undoubtedly the ‘central ﬁxation’ for law
enforcement ofﬁcials has been upon the proﬁling of Muslims
(Monaghan and Molnar, 2016, p 402). As Monaghan and Molnar
go on to suggest, “it is precisely in the reiﬁcation of particular
attributes as part of the governance of future risks that radicali-
sation knowledge are twinned with the identiﬁcation of generic
characteristics of Islam that could be indicators of future vio-
lence” (Monaghan and Molnar, 2016, p 401).
The indicators around ‘extremist types’ are therefore not bias-
free largely due to the fact that the very signiﬁer of ‘radical’ comes
with a set of distinct essentializing features (ibid). As a result, the
indicators are guided by an Islamophobic logic; in very much the
Fig. 1 Channel Awareness Training. This image is not covered by a CC BY license
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same way that Lombroso’s observations of criminal types were
also guided by a racist logic. In Criminal Man, for example,
Lombroso writes:
Those who have read this far should now be persuaded that
criminals resemble savages and the coloured races. These
groups have many characteristics in common, including,
thinness of body hair, low degrees of strength and below-
average weight, small cranial capacities, sloping foreheads,
and swollen sinuses. Members of both groups frequently
have sutures of the central brow ridge, precocious synostes
or disarticulation of the frontal bones, upwardly arching
temporal bones, sutural simplicity, thick skulls, over-
developed jaws and cheekbones, oblique eyes, dark skin,
thick and curly hair, and jug ears (Lombroso, [1876] 2006,
p 91).
He then goes on to suggest:
Among habitual criminals as among savages, we ﬁnd less
sexual differentiation between normal men and women. In
addition, in both we ﬁnd insensitivity to pain, lack of moral
sense, revulsion for work, absence of remorse, lack of
foresight, vanity, superstitiousness, self-importance, and
ﬁnally, an underdeveloped concept of divinity and morality
(ibid).
In the former explanation provided by Lombroso we see overt
support for scientiﬁc/biological accounts of race. Such a reading
of race as described earlier, is characteristic of the times in which
Lombroso was writing whereby assumptions that particular eth-
nic groups have biologically inheritable characteristics became
institutionally embedded. In the latter explanation, the attributes
listed by Lombroso are broader and move beyond physical traits
to cultural traits, which appear on the surface to be more sub-
jective. However, as we have seen, Lombroso is guided by a
particular understanding of race and crime. In the same way that
the 22 indicators of extremism are wide-ranging, it might be
useful to consider that they too are guided by a particular cultural
understanding of Muslims and extremism which assumes a causal
link between the two (Monaghan and Molnar, 2016, p 401).
The Prevent programme appears to share with Lombroso an
attempt to ‘objectively’ link criminality with race, and extremism
with Muslims, respectively. This of course is the main weakness of
positivist criminology. Such a linking, whether through science,
biology or culture, does not emerge naturally. Rather it is estab-
lished to operate politically as a way of disciplining and punishing
racially marked bodies; historically through systems of slavery,
colonialism, the holocaust, and apartheid, and in more recent
times, through systems of racial proﬁling, stop and search, and
de-radicalisation programmes. What we are seeing in the Prevent
policy then is the continuation of 19th century ideas that sought
to regulate racialized communities. Perhaps the only twist is that
the seemingly biological has been replaced by a stronger focus on
the cultural (Goldberg, 2002, p 26). In the knowledge formations
around contemporary Islamic extremism the idea of race appears
to serve as a central feature to essentialize Muslims in a misguided
and irresponsible quest to correct, reverse or stop the radicali-
sation process.
For Lombroso the prevention of crime could be best achieved
through ‘scientiﬁc policing.’ He argued that:
Hitherto policing was conducted much as wars used to be
waged: randomly and on the basis of hunches. Successful
investigations depended on the astuteness and dedication of
a few individuals. What we need now is to apply the
scientiﬁc method to the identiﬁcation of criminals (Lom-
broso, [1876] 2006, p 331).
Since 9/11 exceptional measures have been implemented to
gather intelligence on citizens. This has included the monitoring
of telephone patterns without permission, the snooping of
Internet browsing histories, and unlawful wiretapping (Lustick,
2006, p 32; Bauman and Lyon, 2013, p 107). Advanced surveil-
lance technologies continue to seep into everyday life-worlds
shaping the experiences of Muslims and racially marked popu-
lations more broadly. The mapping of the ‘electronic footprint,’
the collection of biometric data, and the use of complex algo-
rithmic data in government watchlists have all been normalised in
the West’s war against terrorism (Amoore and Goede, 2008, p
182).
In the informal space, Lombroso proposed that crime pre-
vention measures should operate in schools:
Born criminals should not be allowed to inﬁltrate
elementary schools because education would harm both
them and society… Advances in criminal anthropology
have now made possible the preventative isolation of
criminals- the most important measure of social defence.
Teachers are now able to identify in children the incurable
signs of inborn criminality and use these signs to
distinguish between innate criminality and the temporary
criminality of all youth. These signs include physiological
and craniological anomalies in children, coupled with
tendencies toward wrongdoing (Lombroso, [1876] 2006, pp
334–335).
Lombroso would perhaps take solace in the workings of the
current Prevent strategy. Under the Counter-Terrorism and
Security Act (Sept 2015) public sector bodies (e.g., education,
health, local councils, amongst others) across the UK have a legal
duty to refer potential ‘extremists’ to an appropriate body if they
show signs of becoming ‘radicalised’ (Sian, The Guardian, 21 July
2015b). As we have already seen in the above examples, risk
averse administrators have used this obligation to criminalise a
whole range of legitimate activities, including book-reading,
talking about eco-activism etc. The argument that British uni-
versities are crucibles of radicalisation continues to animate
government thinking on this topic and strongly echoes Lom-
broso’s thesis around schools playing a central role in detecting
criminality in children. The legal obligation of teachers to
essentially spy on students via training on extremism has proven
a farce at best (Sian, 2015a, pp 183–201). In the same way that it
is absurd to suggest that teachers should be able to detect ‘phy-
siological and craniological anomalies in children, coupled with
tendencies toward wrongdoing’ as proposed by Lombroso, it is
just as nonsensical to place a legal obligation on teachers to
(impossibly) spot the signs of extremism in children. It would
therefore seem to be the case that these measures serve a speciﬁc
political function and sit within a broader historical narrative of
racial repression.
Contemporary ‘scientiﬁc’ surveillance measures have
undoubtedly targeted Muslim populations, however the social
control of racially marked groups is by no means a new phe-
nomenon. Practices designed to socially control racialized
populations gathered pace in the 19th century prompted largely
by the modern eugenics movement, which was spearheaded by
Sir Francis Galton in 1865 (Lee, 2015, p 33). Such thinking
inspired forced sterilisation programmes of blacks, Native
Americans and Latinos across the USA, and of indigenous
communities in Australia and Canada. The uptake of eugenicist
approaches also paved the way for genocide in Nazi Germany, the
exercise of miscegenation laws in the USA, and strict immigration
policies across Western nations (Garner, 2010, pp 71–75).
Although the eugenics movement lost its popularity following the
death of millions of Jews in Nazi Germany, the logics of
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population control through what can be described as racialized
governmentality stayed put (Hesse and Sayyid, 2006, p 21), par-
ticularly within the sphere of law enforcement. That is, positivist
methods have remained paramount in the restricting, manage-
ment, and surveillance of racially marked groups who have
increasingly come to represent criminals, deviants, threats, sus-
pects and undesirables in the Western psyche (Amin, 2014, p
102).
In his pioneering work Policing the Crisis, Stuart Hall et al.
(2013) demonstrated that from the early 1970s onwards, British
law enforcement ofﬁcials, political discourse and sensational
media coverage were all central in the production of an (empty)
association between black youth and ‘mugging,’ to the extent by
which, “mugging and black crime are now virtually synonymous”
(Hall, et al. 2013, p 321). Through a series of moral panics the
theme of ‘black crime’ generated public hysteria around social
order and racial ‘others.’ By ‘objectively’ equating mugging to
black youth, ofﬁcial responses in the form of oppressive street
policing in inner city areas i.e., ‘trouble spots,’ were legitimised
(ibid, p 326). The disproportionate use of stop and search and
racial proﬁling of black youth in both the UK and USA has been
documented widely. As Angela Davis (2003) argues, “that it is
possible to be targeted by the police for no other reason than the
colour of one’s skin is not mere speculation” (Davis, 2003, pp
30–31). Davis goes on to point out that in the US, “police
departments in major urban areas have admitted the existence of
formal procedures designed to maximise the numbers of African-
Americans and Latinos arrested- even in the absence of probable
cause” (ibid, p 31).
Lombroso’s application of the ‘scientiﬁc method’ to the iden-
tiﬁcation of criminals, in place of ‘policing based on hunches,’ is
now a dominant method of ﬁghting crime. In other words,
positivist assumptions tend to underlie modern policing practices
which are increasingly organised around the idea that a crime is
caused by easily identiﬁable indicators. Not only in popular cul-
ture have we seen this shift being documented in TV series with
savvy CSI style programmes replacing the traditional Columbo
genre of crime entertainment, but also in practice societies have
witnessed an expediential growth and sophistication of DNA
databases, retina recognition technologies, and forensic bio-
metrics, which continue to advance in the pursuit of social con-
trol. The use of such scientiﬁc methods in law enforcement
agencies reproduces race-thinking logics. As Robert Carter (2007)
argues, police DNA databases reﬂect racial (gender and class)
biases of policing, by developing speciﬁc correlations between the
genetic proﬁles of different types of criminals (Carter, 2007, p
552). In terms of contemporary migration and border control
regulation, Katja Franko Aas (2011) documents extensively the
ways in which racially marked migrants in particular have
become criminalized and managed through a plethora of systems
monitoring their moves. From the Schengen Information System
which serves as the largest operational database related to police,
judicial assistance and external border control in Europe, to the
Eurodac database which registers and compares the ﬁngerprints
of asylum seekers, alongside the Visa Information System, the
Automatic Border Crossing system and the Entry/Exists System (to
name but a few) the ‘crimmigrant body’ is subjected to hi-tech
modes of surveillance and governance (Aas, 2011, pp 334–336).
These examples all seem to point to the way in which the
political construction of the racialized body has served as a tool,
both historically and in the present, to ensure the hegemony of
whiteness, Western superiority, and positivism. Prevent might be
best understood as yet another chapter in the dusty catalogue of
European positivist criminology- that is a ﬁeld as well as a
practice which has always been dependent upon the ‘scientiﬁc’
category of ‘race.’
The limits of positivism
In his book, Counter-Colonial Criminology, Agozino offers critical
insights into positivist criminology and the work it has done, and
continues to do, in reproducing colonial knowledge formations.
His ideas are thus signiﬁcant for the development of the critique
of positivist forms of thinking and its relationship with the
colonial. One way to understand the war on terror is as a colonial
campaign of counter-insurgency being waged in a postcolonial
context.7 The intersection between colonialism and positivism is
not purely accidental, in that, the colonial enterprise was ima-
gined and implemented through the positivist appropriation of
the colonised, through surveys, censuses and various classiﬁcatory
schemes.8 Agozino makes the explicit link between Lombroso’s
positivism and the racial science upon which it was built:
Positivism may assume that sense-impressions are the only
basis of knowledge, but Lombroso’s theory is not
‘positivistic’ simply because it adopted operational deﬁni-
tions of causal attributes. Lombroso’s claim to valid
knowledge was not merely based on the appeal to
immediate apprehensible measurements. It was based on
ideological ‘truths’ derived from race-class-gender stereo-
types and imperial dogma (Agozino, 2003, p 82).
In his reading of Stephen Pfohl and Gordon’s (1986) essay on
‘Criminological Displacements: A Sociological Deconstruction,’
Agozino builds a convincing set of arguments around how we
might challenge the enterprise of positivist criminology, which as
this paper has mapped out has been central to the governing of
racial/Muslim populations. Agozino examines Pfohl and Gor-
don’s analysis to demonstrate the limits of positivist criminology,
which is argued to be rooted within three interconnected ‘plea-
sures’ as opposed to ‘truths.’ They include, ﬁrstly the pleasures of
sadism: mastering the facts of crime as ‘things.’ This refers to the
hierarchy between the criminologist as ‘he’ and the criminal as
‘she.’ In this positivist framing, the criminal (like the woman)
represents a constitutive ‘Other,’ which is to be ‘penetrated’ as a
way to ‘master’ the causes of criminal behaviour (Agozino, 2003,
p 96). This mirrors the way in which the dominant male gaze
functions to subordinate women, i.e., “master them, penetrate
them, lay them bare and control them” (ibid). In this way, the
sadism is less about rationality and more about the pleasure of
exerting power over others (ibid). In other words, the pleasure
comes from the ability to inﬂict pain on other bodies.
The second aspect is, the pleasure of surveillance: the eye upon
her is the gaze that categorises the Other. Here it is argued that
positivism is viewed as ‘the end of ideology’ as it is based upon the
assumption that the Other can be measured, controlled, and
differentiated through close observation. It assumes that those
who adopt positivist methodologies will generate the same set of
results allowing for claims to be checked for reliability (ibid).
Thirdly is, the pleasure of truth: the normal subject and his
Other. This pleasure is centred around the notion of ‘truth,’
whereby the assumption of criminologists, police ofﬁcials,
judges, psychiatrists and so on, is that both victims and
offenders are telling the truth, and if they are not this can be
unmasked through skilful questioning. In this way criminal
justice actors are able to make claims for the superiority of their
truth, “because it is not the truth of an individual but the
balanced, objective truth gleaned from all the individual truths
told by interviewees” (ibid). As Agozino goes on to suggest, in
his critique of reason Foucault (1961) proposes that it is pre-
cisely this ‘pleasure of truth’ underlying positivism which must
be critiqued, not for the purpose of revealing a higher truth, but
rather, “for the purpose of exposing the will to power inherent
in what seems to be a disinterested objective view” (ibid, pp
96–97).
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In the Prevent strategy, it would appear that the mastering of
the (Muslim) ‘Other’ has been a focal point in organising lengthy
classiﬁcations around ‘extremist types,’ (similar to Lombroso’s
categories around criminals types). By utilising positivist thinking
based on the ERG22+, Prevent practitioners (as well as law
enforcement ofﬁcials and teachers etc.) seek to dominate and
discipline Muslim bodies.9 We have also seen how surveillance
operates as the principle feature in Prevent discourse, whereby
civil society and public sector bodies, have been drawn in to
observe, spy upon and control the Muslim body. The rolling out
of the Prevent policy in such a way follows suit with the positivist
tradition to ensure that its results can be measured, compared and
classiﬁed. This has given credence to ideas that the various
indicators and proﬁle analysis have a ‘deﬁnite truth’ and operate
objectively (Monaghan and Molnar, 2016, p 400).
Finally we can observe in the Prevent strategy the way in which
the idea of a superior ‘truth’ guides the regulation of Muslim
bodies. As Monaghan and Molnar (2016) note, surveillance
practices around counter-terrorism can be seen as Orientalist
knowledge constructions. In this way, Western knowledge oper-
ates to legitimise representations of Muslims, “through inferior,
illiberal and irrational essentialisations” (ibid). The ‘truth’ that
appears to be driving Prevent is often presented as being evidence
based, however, despite its grand claims for scientiﬁc objectivity,
we have seen a degree of uncertainty in the Prevent strategy,
which seems to be guided more by historic policies and practices
associated with racism and contemporary forms of structured
Islamophobia, as opposed to logic.
Instead of the obsessive prodding and poking of Muslims, it
might be more useful to look beyond positivist inspired de-
radicalisation programmes like Prevent, both conceptually and
empirically, because the issue is perhaps not simply about ‘cor-
recting’ ‘defected’ behaviours and mindsets, but rather about
profoundly changing structural conditions. Following Weber’s
(1970) seminal works on the limits of science, Stuart Hall, (1992)
reminds us that scientiﬁc rationality, “leads not to the ‘emanci-
pation’ which the Enlightenment hoped for, but to ‘a senseless
hustle in the service of worthless,…self contradictory,… antag-
onistic ends’” (Hall, 1992, p 256). Perhaps this best sums up
positivist thinking and practice.
The value of Prevent
A decade of Prevent has seen its expansion both in terms of the
various sections of society brought under its preview as well as its
export to other countries. The decade has also brought an
entrenchment of Prevent, as criticisms of the programme are
dismissed as matters of empirical detail: faulty delivery, over-
zealous implementation etc. This paper demonstrates that the
problems with Prevent are conceptually deeper. By reading Pre-
vent in comparison to Lombroso’s studies in criminology, it is
possible to place Prevent where it belongs—in a history of racial
science. What we see in Prevent is the persistence of positivist
ideas used to aimlessly classify and categorise particular indivi-
duals and groups in the pursuit of countering extremism. As this
paper has illustrated, there appears to be an overwhelming lack of
consistency to such classiﬁcations and categorisations, which
seem to conﬁrm the parameters of positivism. The common
feature grouping together Lombroso’s account of criminal types;
eugenics and Nazi racial theory; muggings and stop and search;
and extremism and the Prevent strategy, is the idea of a ﬁxed
racial/religious/cultural essence.
In the same way that the race-thinking behind Lombroso’s
criminal types ultimately failed, those trying to get to the root cause
of extremism through Islamophobic, positivist frameworks, are also
destined to fail, because perhaps the answer to this puzzle is that
there is no ‘essence’ to be found. These approaches are guilty of
reproducing and reinforcing biological, scientiﬁc, and cultural forms
of racism, while, at the same time, dismissing and failing to identify
the contingent and political nature of the process. In its current
form, Prevent can only offer us an ever-lengthening index of key
features on how to spot an extremist (and not much more). It might
therefore be more useful to instead dismantle these typologies since
there is no radical ‘gene’ to be discovered and eliminated. Such a
lens limits us to seeing crime, deviance, and political violence as
merely a pathology to be eradicated (Young, 2011, p 199). By
understanding radicalisation in these frameworks all that can be
done is to furnish more descriptions to a never-ending list, which
appears to be spiralling out of control.
Lombroso was widely discredited because people began to
realise that his positivist measurements didn’t quite work for
understanding crime. Perhaps then, Western societies might also
realise that his measurements do not work for understanding
radicalisation either. Ultimately, when political and social actors
grasp that these issues cannot be measured according to skull
sizes, nose shapes, beards, veils, and culture clashes, we might
begin thinking sensibly about how we are to change the system as
opposed to the individual. That is, understanding crime cannot
simply be reduced to uncovering quantiﬁable patterns of criminal
activity. Its analysis requires us to engage with historical and
social contexts, and it is precisely these contexts that positivism
denies in its quest for a universal understanding of criminals and
criminality unencumbered (Walklate, 1998, p 3). If we are serious
about challenging discourses on radicalisation, it would be more
useful to critique those societies which are at the forefront of
waging illegal wars, abusing human rights and breaching the rule
of law (Wight, 2015, p 212). In other words, it is perhaps less
about culture, biology or science, and more about the political.
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Notes
1 In recent years literature has appeared which argues for ‘race-thinking’ to be part of
multiple modernities throughout Eurasia, see for example: Goldberg (2009) ‘Racial
comparisons, relational racisms: some thoughts on method’ pp. 1271–1282, and Law
(2012) Red Racisms: Racism in Communist and Post-Communist Contexts.
2 Scientiﬁc/biological understandings of race do not operate independently from cultural
understandings of race, as Murji and Solomos (2015) rightly point out, “the whole
apparatus of race has always been as much about culture as it has nature” (Murji and
Solomos, 2015, p 269). Echoing this argument, Young (1994) reminds us that the
biological and the cultural have always gone hand in hand in understandings of race
(Young, 1994, p 161). The argument for the purpose of this paper is that the war on
terror has accentuated the focus on the cultural (but not at the expense of the
biological).
3 For example see, The Guardian (24 Sept 2015) ‘Student accused of being a terrorist for
reading book on terrorism’ https://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/sep/24/
student-accused-being-terrorist-reading-book-terrorism (Accessed March 2017).
4 For example see, The Independent (14 Feb 2016) ‘Anti-terror police question
schoolboy for wearing pro-Palestine badge’ http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
anti-terror-police-question-schoolboy-for-wearing-pro-palestine-badge-a6873656.
html (Accessed March 2017).
5 For example see, The Telegraph (29 Oct 2017) ‘Ifhat Smith- An Apology’ http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/29/ifhat-smith--an-apology/ (Accessed Mar 2017).
6 For example see, The Independent (10 July 2015) ‘Government deradicalisation plan
will brand Muslims with beards as terrorists, say academics’ http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/uk/politics/government-deradicalisation-plan-will-brand-muslims-with-
beards-as-terrorists-say-academics-10381796.html (Accessed Mar 2017).
7 For further elaboration see: Sayyid (2013) ‘The Dynamics of a Postcolonial War’ pp.
277–292.
8 For detailed discussion see: Cohn (1996) Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The
British India, and Richards (1993) The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy
of Empire.
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9 This is a hallmark of Islamophobia as described by Sayyid and Vakil (2010) in
Thinking Through Islamophobia.
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